Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
S lowdowns in economic activity often leave state policymakers facing budget shortfalls and the prospects of reducing services. For example, as a result of the 2001 recession, the National Governors Association reported that 21 states enacted negative growth budgets in FY2003 and further reduced budgeted spending during the year by an additional $12 billion. Despite the attention given to state fi scal problems during slowdowns, few studies have attempted to quantify the "fi scal stress" that states experience due to recessions. This is important because, unlike the federal government, the options available for mitigating recessions at the subnational level are limited by various institutional constraints such as balanced budget rules, borrowing restrictions, and tax limitation laws (Poterba, 1994) . As a result, the number of states utilizing a rainy day fund to help accumulate savings has grown from fewer than ten in 1980 to more than 45 by the start of the 2001 recession.
In this paper we make use of a Markov switching regression model, popularized by Hamilton (1989) , to empirically describe the distribution of state expansions and contractions using monthly data and extend the fi scal stress literature along multiple dimensions. First, while previous authors have modeled the distribution of shortfalls a state is likely to face in a single fi scal year, our approach permits the duration of downturns to exist for an arbitrary number of periods to explore the likely impact of multi-year recessions on state revenue.
Next, if policymakers wish to save during periods of growth to hedge against downturns, then knowledge of an expected shortfall is of limited value because the duration of expansions is uncertain. In other words, if two states are expected to experience identical fi scal stress during a normal downturn (say ten percent of the budget), then the amount policymakers would need to save during each expansion period to offset the downturn will be different depending on the expansions that are likely to prevail. Using the estimated distribution of state expansions and contractions, we demonstrate how a distribution of savings rates may be constructed so that policymakers can determine the necessary amount to save during expansions to hedge all of the possible expansion-contraction combinations that may occur with a given level of certainty. The determination of savings rates has been overlooked in the literature and if policymakers wish to use savings as a means of insuring against fi scal shocks, then knowledge of a savings rate is arguably more valuable than knowledge of an expected shortfall.
Finally, our approach is very general with regard to the measurement of shortfalls and, therefore, can easily be modifi ed to cover a variety of fi scal objectives. We present estimates of the distributions of state shortfalls and savings rates using two different shortfall measures that refl ect a reasonable range of objectives that policymakers may wish to consider.
In the following sections of the paper we review previous research, outline our empirical methodology and fi ndings, and offer concluding remarks.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THE MEASUREMENT OF STATE FISCAL STRESS

Literature Review
Previous studies have addressed the issue of measuring fiscal stress from the perspective of an "optimal" rainy day fund (or budget stabilization fund) because if policymakers wish to guard against recessions via a savings instrument, then knowledge of the fi scal stress they are expected to encounter is essential. 2 The information that is perhaps the most valuable to policymakers regarding fi scal stress is how likely a state will be to face a future shortfall of a given size, and what savings rate they need to follow during expansions in order to accumulate their target level of funds before the next downturn. Given that economic cycles are not perfectly predictable, a methodology describing the distribution of shortfalls and savings rates is more informative than an approach that generates a point-estimate. Modeling the distribution of shortfalls requires focusing on the contraction phase of state economic cycles, while modeling the distribution of savings rates requires examining both expansions and contractions.
Multiple strategies could be pursued to empirically model state expansions and contractions in order to construct distributions of shortfalls and savings rates. A Markov regime switching regression 2 The use of the term "optimal" in this literature refers to the notion that if a state normally experiences fi scal stress equal to ten percent of the budget during recessions, then savings equal to that amount would be suffi cient to offset the shortfall. It is not meant to imply what level of savings may be optimal given the preferences, constraints, and opportunity costs facing policymakers or citizens. For recent work on the political and institutional constraints facing state policymakers, as well as the effectiveness of rainy day funds, see Wagner and Elder (2005) , Wagner (2004) , Cornia and Mattoon (2003) .
is well suited for this task because the model's parameters explicitly describe the distribution of multiple "regimes" (such as an expansion and a contraction) and estimation of the model jointly determines the parameter values describing each regime that best fit the observed data. These parameters include the mean growth rate of each regime, as well as the probabilities that a given observation came from either an expansion or contraction regime, which are known as transition probabilities. The expected duration of each regime can be computed from the transition probabilities. Previous research has ignored the calculation of savings rates, focusing instead on measuring shortfalls using approaches that are based on the deviation from a linear trend and value-at-risk (VaR), which is a common technique used to model portfolio risk in the finance literature. The linear-trend method, followed by Pollock and Suyderhoud (1986) , Sobel and Holcombe (1996) , and Navin and Navin (1997) , has generated a point-estimate that is equal to the cumulative deviation from trend. For example, Sobel and Holcombe (1996) sum the cumulative shortfalls in expenditures and revenues from their respective trends from 1989 to 1992 and fi nd that the average state would have needed reserves equal to 30 percent of expenditures in order to maintain trend expenditures and revenues during the 1990-91 recession. Examining individual states over a longer time period, Pollock and Suyderhoud (1986) and Navin and Navin (1997) fi nd that savings equal to 11 and 13 percent of the budget in Indiana and Ohio would be sufficient to offset a normal downturn.
Although the aforementioned studies provide only point-estimates, it is possible (but not optimal) to use the linear-trend method to model the distribution of shortfalls and savings rates. Designating observations that are above and below trend as expansions and contractions, respectively, one could then compute the average expansion growth rate, the average contraction growth rate, and the transition probabilities using the observations that fall into each classifi cation.
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The major problem with this approach is that there is no reason to believe that the expansion and contraction periods that one identifi es will coincide at all with actual business-cycle movements. This is because a linear-trend model optimizes over the choice of the intercept and slope parameters to minimize the deviation from trend rather than optimizing over the parameters that best describe the distribution of expansions and contractions. In other words, a linear-trend approach estimates the parameters that are needed to form the distributions of shortfalls and savings rates as a secondary step, whereas a Markov switching regression directly optimizes over the choice of these parameters. 4 In addition, given that Pollock and Suyderhoud (1986), Sobel and Holcombe (1996) , and Navin and Navin (1997) classify contractions as observations below trend, the soundness of their point-estimates depends on how closely their expansion-contraction classifications coincide with actual business-cycle movements.
In contrast, Cornia and Nelson (2003) model the distribution of budget defi cits in Utah using value-at-risk and estimate that there is a 95 percent chance that Utah's deficit will be no worse than $135 million in a single fi scal year.
5 Even though Cornia and Nelson limit the time horizon to one year, VaR may be extended to multiple periods to incorporate downturns lasting longer than one year, which is important considering that Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) fi nd that state-level recessions last on average for 16 months. However, because standard VaR analysis assumes that the data are being generated from a single probability distribution, it is incapable of modeling the distribution of savings rates because they are a function of the distribution of both expansions and contractions. 6 
Measuring State Fiscal Stress
The measurement of state fi scal stress, at least conceptually, merely involves quantifying how downturns force revenues and expenditures to deviate from the "norm." Since tax bases are procyclical and tend to be more volatile than state economies, holding tax rates constant over the business cycle and assessing the decline in revenue would capture the revenue side. Given Dye and McGuire's (1999) fi nding that several components of spending, such as public welfare and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), tend to increase during downturns, expenditure-side fi scal stress could be evaluated by allowing social assistance spending to increase holding non-welfare spending constant. A natural measure of state fi scal stress would, therefore, be the state's cyclical surplus/defi cit because it would capture the response of both revenues and expenditures to downturns.
From a practical perspective, it may be possible to construct a cyclical defi cit/surplus series for each state that is equal to the difference between the cyclical components of revenue and spending, holding constant tax rates and non-welfare spending. A regime-switching regression could then be applied to the defi cit series in order to construct a probabilistic model of both the state's expected defi cit and the savings required during the cyclical surplus to offset the defi cit.
A potential problem arises with using a cyclical defi cit because studies such as Knight, Kusko, and Rubin (2003) , Baker, Besendorfer, and Kotlikoff (2002) , and Kusko and Rubin (1993) fi nd that state budgets tend to be structurally imbalanced.
7 If a structural defi cit is present, then how meaningful and intuitive is it to model the business-cycle behavior of the cyclical defi cit? Suppose, using the cyclical defi cit as the measure of fi scal stress, 5 VaR analysis is a confi dence interval approach based on the assumption that the data are being generated from a single probability distribution (typically a normal distribution). Thus, given a mean and standard deviation computed from the data, an empirical distribution is constructed from the possible outcomes and the associated probability that each outcome will occur. For a fi xed time period and level of confi dence such as x percent, the value-at-risk is the outcome above which x percent of the possible outcomes lie. Since VaR specifi es a fi xed number of periods, it is used in the fi nance literature to address the question, "What is the maximum loss to expect from a portfolio over the next t years with a given level of certainty?". 6 Given that value-at-risk forms a confi dence interval based on a distribution of possible outcomes, we are performing VaR in the sense that we form distributions of shortfalls and savings rates based on our estimated distribution of expansions and contractions. However, there is one notable difference between our approach and a standard VaR. The Markov-switching regression assumes that expansions and contractions are generated by potentially different distributions, which Diebold and Rudebusch (1996) argue has been the dominant view of business-cycle research since the 1940s. A standard VaR assumes the data are generated by a single probability distribution so there are no transition probabilities in the VaR framework. This precludes modeling the data as being generated by two (or more) distributions because the transition probabilities provide the structure governing the most likely distribution from which to draw an outcome. Billio and Pelizzon (2000) employed such a multi-distribution VaR to examine stock portfolios and, as an intermediate step, utilized a Markov-switching regression to estimate the transition probabilities between distributions. 7 Knight et al. (2003) and Kusko and Rubin (1993) reach their conclusion using a high-employment budget surplus/defi cit measure for the aggregate state and local sector. Baker et al. (2002) examine the present value of projected expenditures, revenues, and net debt of individual states in FY1999 and fi nd that well over half it is estimated that a state would require savings equal to ten percent of revenue (to be accumulated during an expansionary phase when the cyclical surplus is positive) in order to weather 75 percent of the possible cyclical defi cits that may arise during downturns. This level of savings would be suffi cient to close the gap between cyclical revenue and cyclical spending in three out of every four recessions, but it would be insuffi cient to close the gap between actual revenue and actual spending in three out of four recessions due to the structural gap.
In addition, if a structural gap is present, then a state's actual budget position could be in a defi cit at a time when the cyclical position is one of surplus. Given the structural-defi cit issue, we assess fi scal stress by focusing on the cyclical behavior of state revenue growth. The advantage of examining revenue growth is that our results are intuitive and readily comparable across states. The obvious disadvantage is that our estimates do not include fi scal stress generated from the expenditure side of the budget.
8 Thus, our results provide a conservative look at state fi scal cycles and may be viewed as the minimum fi scal stress that states are likely to experience during a downturn.
REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL AND PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Regime-Switching Model
The motivation behind regime-switching models is that many time series appear to be generated from multiple, distinct data generating processes because of such events as economic downturns, policy changes, and fi nancial crises (Hamilton, 1994) .
The extensive use of Markov switching models over the last decade, particularly in the macroeconomic and fi nancial literature, is due to Hamilton's (1989) extension to include serially dependent data. Hamilton applied a two-regime autoregression to the growth rate in real U.S. GNP assuming the regimes exogenously switched according to an unobserved Markov process. The best fi t occurred when the mean growth rate in one regime was 1.2 percent (an expansion regime) and the mean growth rate in the second regime was -0.4 percent (a contraction regime). Each regime also exhibited considerable persistence, with the probability of remaining in an expansion (contraction) in period t given that the economy was expanding (contracting) in period t -1 estimated to be 0.90 (0.75). Perhaps the most attractive feature of Hamilton's univariate model was that the estimated timing of regime switches closely matched the official National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business-cycle turning points.
Despite the widespread application to aggregate data, only Owyang et al. (2005) have applied a regime-switching model to U.S. states. Using Crone's (2002) state-level monthly coincident index, Owyang et al. estimate a two-regime Markov switching model with no autoregressive dynamics for each state to identify business-cycle turning points and explore the extent to of the states have structural defi cits. The high-employment budget approach uses data from the National Income and Product Accounts, and Kusko and Rubin (1993) discuss the diffi culties in applying this approach to individual states due to data limitations. 8 In examining the high-employment defi cit for the state and local sector, Kusko and Rubin (1993) note that "the bulk of the cyclical infl uence on state and local budgets is on the receipts side of the ledger" (413). Moreover, Sorensen and Yosha (2001), who examine how state total revenues and expenditures react to current and lagged output changes, also fi nd that revenues respond more strongly than expenditures to shocks. This suggests that, while social assistance spending is countercyclical, most fi scal stress may in fact manifest itself through the revenue side of the budget. In addition, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 altered the social assistance funding mechanism between states and the federal government. States now receive an annual block grant, as opposed to matching grants, and are able to retain surplus funds for use in future years, which may improve their ability to absorb increased caseloads during downturns. For an overview of the sensitivity of state social assistance spending to the business cycle, see McGuire and Merriman (2005 
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where μ denotes the mean growth rate and ε t is the zero-mean innovation at time t assumed to be normally distributed with variance σ ε 2 . The growth rate in [1] switches exogenously between two regimes and the switches are governed by an unobserved regime variable, S t = {0,1}. When S t = 0, which we refer to as the low-growth regime ẏ t , follows a stationary AR(0) process and is generated by a normal distribution with a mean of μ 0 . When S t switches from zero to one, which we call the high-growth regime, ẏ t is presumed to have been drawn from a normal distribution with a mean equal to μ 0 + μ 1 . In short, the data generating process for ẏ t is a mixture of two normal distributions having the same variance but potentially different means.
Although S t is unobserved, its behavior is restricted to evolve according to a fi rst-order, two-state Markov chain with the following transition matrix: 
where P ij is the transition probability of S t = i given that S t-1 = j. Hence, P HH is the probability that economic activity is in the high-growth regime in period t conditional on having been in the high-growth regime in period t -1. Placing restrictions on the behavior of S t allows one to estimate the probability that economic activity is an expansion (or contraction) regime in each time period despite the fact that the underlying regime is assumed to be latent and unobservable. We follow Owyang et al. (2005) and estimate [1] and [2] using the Bayesian Gibbssampling approach for Markov switching models developed by Kim and Nelson (1998) . Since a step-by-step description of the sampling procedure is provided in Kim and Nelson (1999) , we will only briefl y review it here. Kim and Nelson's Bayesian approach treats the model's parameters (μ 0 , μ 1 , P HH , P LL , σ ε 2 ) and unobserved regime variable (S t ) as unknown random variables that can be evaluated from sampling from the appropriate conditional posterior distributions. The draws from the conditional posterior distributions form an irreducible Markov chain that converges to the joint posterior distribution of the parameters conditional on the data. 9 9 Our joint posterior distributions were simulated using 10,000 replications with an additional 2,000 burn-in replications, and our prior distributions were set equal to the priors of Owyang et al. (2005) . The mean parameters (μ 0 and μ 1 ) are assumed to be normally distributed with means of 1 and -1, respectively, and a variance-covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. The transition probabilities, P HH and P LL , have prior Beta distributions given by β(9,1) and β(8,2), implying means of 0.9 and 0.8, respectively. We acknowledge use of the computer routines described in Kim and Nelson (1999) .
Regime-Switching Estimates
Parameter estimates from each state's Markov switching model, which are the means of the posterior distributions, are presented in Table 1 . The expected duration of each regime, which is discussed in more detail below, is also presented.
As expected, the regime-switching parameter estimates closely match Owyang et al.'s (2005) fi ndings and illustrate the considerable variation in state-level business-cycle characteristics. While the median expansion and contraction (monthly) growth rates across states are 0.384 and -0.137, expansion growth rates vary from 0.210 to 0.612 and contraction growth rates vary from -1.204 to 0.217.
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The asterisk next to the growth rates in Table 1 signifi es that zero is not an element in the parameter's 90 th percentile highest posterior density interval. All 50 of the expansion growth rates and 37 of the contraction growth rates appear to be different from zero.
Given an expansion in period t -1, our estimates indicate that the median state has a 0.980 probability of expanding in period t. Similarly, the median state has a 0.932 probability of contracting in period t given a contraction in period t -1. As Hamilton (1994) shows, the expected duration of regime j may be computed as Thus, the baseline regime for all states is one of expansion because the model identifi ed 78 percent of the observations as expansions and the remaining 22 percent as contractions, which corresponds closely to the expansion-contraction percentages the NBER has identifi ed for GDP.
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SHORTFALLS, SAVINGS RULES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AN "OPTIMAL" RAINY DAY FUND
Probability Distributions of State Revenue Shortfalls
The estimated parameters of the regime-switching regressions provide measures of the amplitude and duration of state economic cycles. In this section we demonstrate how these parameters may be used to construct probability distributions of state revenue shortfalls.
Because the regime-switching models were applied to state coincident indexes rather than revenue, we defi ne ϕ as the elasticity of a state's total revenue (holding tax rates constant) with respect to economic activity. A state's high-and low-regime growth rates in revenue are then given by g H = ϕ(μ 0 + μ 1 ) and g L = ϕμ 0 , respectively, which allows us to capture the possibility that revenue growth may be more (or less) cyclical than overall economic activity because of the state's particular tax mix. We assume each state's revenue growth has the same transition probabilities as the state's overall economic activity and select two reasonable revenue elasticities (1.2 and 1.5) to examine the sensitivity of our estimates. Since P LL is the probability of being in a low-growth regime in period t given a low-growth regime in period t -1, the probability that a downturn persists exactly t L periods is given by
A cumulative probability distribution of shortfalls can, therefore, be constructed by computing the shortfall size for a contraction lasting t L = 1, 2, …, ∞ periods and the associated probability that a shortfall lasting exactly that length will occur. An x percent shortfall is defi ned as the shortfall size such that x percent of the possible shortfalls are less than this amount.
In calculating the shortfalls, revenue is assumed to grow at a monthly rate of g H during each expansion period and at a monthly rate of g L during each contraction period. Shortfalls are measured relative to an amplitude parameter, γ, that establishes the target monthly revenue growth rate during contractions. While γ may take on any value, a reasonable lower-and upper-bound to evaluate revenue shortfalls is achieved using γ = 0 and γ = g H . Setting γ = 0 measures the shortfall relative to zero and, therefore, provides an estimate of the savings required to maintain a constant level of revenue (i.e., a zero growth rate) during a contraction. Alternatively, setting γ = g H measures the shortfall relative to the average expansion growth rate and generates the savings necessary to maintain the average expansion growth rate in revenue throughout a contraction. 13 An intermediate case that may also be of interest is the overall average growth rate in revenue, which would lie between 0 and g H . Such a case could be examined by setting γ equal to a state's average growth rate in revenue.
If an expansion lasts t H periods, then a state's level of revenue will be equal to
t H, where R 0 is the initial level of revenue and g H is the expansion growth rate in revenue per period. Assuming a contraction begins and revenue grows at the rate of g L , total revenue in the fi rst low-growth period will be equal to
, so the revenue shortfall will be equal to
. Relative to revenue in the last high-growth period, the shortfall may be written as simply (1 + γ) -(1 + g L ). Thus, for a low-growth regime lasting exactly t L periods, the cumulative revenue shortfall (expressed as a share of revenue) is given by:
For each state, we compute shortfall cumulative density functions (hereafter CDFs) using both γ = 0 and γ = g H , which we refer to as a "constant-revenue shortfall," and an "expansion-revenue shortfall," respectively. 14 The expected and 90 th percentile shortfall values are reported 13 We use the term revenue to refer to the total funds available to fi nance spending. 14 We limit the maximum recession length to 360 months so the shortfall CDFs are constructed varying t L from one to 360 in increments of one.
for each state in Table 2 using revenue elasticities of both 1.2 and 1.5.
15
Assuming a revenue elasticity of 1.2, we fi nd the expected constant-revenue shortfall for the median state to be 2.9 percent of revenue. The estimates range from a high of 10.5 percent of revenue in Alaska to a low of zero in nine states (because of the positive recession growth rates in these states). 16 Fifteen states have expected constant-spending shortfalls in excess of fi ve percent of revenue and two states (Alaska and Wyoming) face expected shortfalls in excess of ten percent of revenue. So, while bond rating agencies suggest that states maintain reserve balances equal to fi ve percent of revenue, which our estimates imply would be more than suffi cient for the "average" state to maintain a constant level of revenue during a typical downturn, our results also demonstrate that a "one-size-fits-all" approach is not appropriate.
For a given revenue elasticity, the expansion-revenue shortfall fi gures are considerably larger than the constant-revenue values. In fact, assuming a revenue elasticity of 1.2, the median expected shortfall using the expansion-revenue method is 13.1 percent of revenue, compared to 2.9 percent using the constantrevenue approach. Moreover, the expected expansion-revenue shortfall values show that 13 states experience shortfalls (relative to their baseline regime) equal to at least 15 percent of revenue during a typical downturn and fi ve states have expected shortfalls in excess of 20 percent of revenue. In other words, in order to maintain the average expansion growth rate in revenue during a typical downturn, setting aside the opportunity costs and political barriers, most states would need to save roughly three times more than the reserve balance suggested by bond rating agencies.
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Savings Rate Rules
In this section of the paper we expand our analysis and illustrate how savings rate rules may be constructed by examining the uncertainty in expansion and contraction lengths. If we equate the accumulated savings from an expansion lasting t H periods with the revenue shortfall from a downturn lasting t L periods, then we can solve for the savings rate associated with that specifi c high-growth, low-growth combination. A cumulative density function for savings rates can be constructed by repeating this process for all possible expansion-contraction combinations.
If policymakers save a fraction of revenue (s) during each period of a highgrowth regime, then revenue will be equal to R 0 (1 + g H ) and savings will be R 0 s (1 + g H ) 15 The shortfall CDFs were constructed by varying the number of periods (length of recessions) and restricting revenue to grow at its estimated average rate each period, g L . An alternative approach would be to vary the length of recessions and also permit the per-period growth rate in revenue to change each recession period. We explored this option by randomly drawing each period's recession growth rate from the estimated normal distribution describing contraction growth rates generated by the switching regression. This produced similar results so we opted to report the simplest case of a constant per-period growth rate in the paper. 16 Because the constant-revenue shortfalls (γ = 0) are measured relative to zero revenue growth, any state that averages a positive recession growth rate in revenue will not face a shortfall. However, when shortfalls are measured relative to expansion revenue (γ = g H ), any state will experience a revenue shortfall if the recession growth rate in revenue is smaller than the expansion growth rate in revenue. 17 The estimates in Table 2 appear to be reasonable for every state, with the exception of Maine. Because the regime-switching model identifi ed Maine's recession regime as being best explained by a very long period of slow positive growth (g L = 0.025 and P LL = 0.980), the expected duration of Maine's expansions and recessions are both estimated to be around four years. While this resulted in a zero constant-revenue shortfall (because of the positive recession growth rate), the expected expansion-revenue shortfall is 237.9 percent of revenue when the elasticity of revenue is 1.2, which is clearly implausible. When states save during expansions, the derivation of the revenue shortfalls from the previous section must be modifi ed slightly to refl ect revenue growth net of savings. Suppose revenue growth shifts to a low-growth regime, then the shortfall in the fi rst low-growth period will be the difference between actual revenue,
, and the target level of revenue,
where γ is the amplitude parameter that denotes the target growth rate in revenue per period during contractions.
Assuming no additional savings in low-growth periods, the shortfall in the fi rst low-growth period is given by
. If the downturn persists into a second period, then revenue will be equal to
2 and the shortfall in the second period will be
] . Thus, the cumulative shortfall following t L recession periods is the sum of t L similarly constructed terms and may be expressed as:
Since 
γ
The constant-revenue (γ = 0) and expansion-revenue (γ = g H ) savings rate in [6] applies to a specifi c (t H , t L ) combination. However, since the probability that a given regime will last exactly t j periods is P j (t j ) = P jj t j -1 -P jj t j for j = H, L, the probability that a high-growth regime lasting exactly t H periods will be followed by a low-growth regime lasting exactly t L periods is P H (t H ) × P L (t L ), assuming the regime durations are independent. Thus, to determine the savings rate required during each year of an expansion that will be suffi cient to guard against x percent of all possible expansion-contraction combinations, we construct a cumulative density function of savings rates from the possible (t H , t L ) combinations. 18 The expected and 75 th percentile savings rate estimates are presented in Table 3 for each state using both the constant-revenue and expansion-revenue shortfalls and revenue elasticities of 1.2 and 1.5.
It is important to note that, while the shortfall values appearing in Table 2 depend on the distribution of contraction regimes, the savings rate fi gures in Table 3 depend on both the distribution of expansions and contractions. As a result, the 75 percent constant-revenue savings rate in a given state cannot be 18 Following our calculations of the shortfalls, we limit the maximum recession and expansion lengths each to be 360 months. Varying t L and t H from one to 360 in increments of one produces 360 shortfall values, 360 different levels of accumulated savings, and 129,600 possible expansion-contraction combinations. The CDFs for savings rates were simplifi ed by setting the real interest rate (r) in equation [6] equal to zero. Assuming a revenue elasticity of 1.2, if policymakers decided to follow the expected constant-revenue savings rate figure, then a state would accumulate suffi cient savings (on average) during an expansion to maintain a constant level of revenue during a contraction. Of course, there will be times when a state will not have sufficient savings and there will also be times when the state will accumulate more savings than is required. On average, however, if policymakers in North Carolina, for instance, saved 0.50 percent of revenue during each year of an expansion, then the state would be able to maintain a constant level of revenue in the next recession and would have zero reserves remaining at the end of the downturn.
Suppose for example that a policymaker in Nebraska wishes to be 75 percent certain her state can accumulate suffi cient savings during expansions in order to maintain the average expansion growth rate in revenue during the next recession. Given the distribution of expansions and contractions in her state, saving 2.3 percent of the level of revenue during each expansion year would be suffi cient to achieve her objective. If such an objective (which one could argue may be too risk-averse or politically unrealistic) were followed, then three out of every four recessions would have no impact on the state from the perspective of revenue growth. However, if policymakers save more than the expected savings rate rules, given either a constant-revenue or expansion-revenue objective, then the state's accumulated reserves would be more than suffi cient, on average, and states would end a contraction with a positive reserve balance.
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CONCLUSION
Economic slowdowns place tremendous pressure on state budgets and often require policymakers to enact unpopular expenditure reductions and/or tax increases. In this paper we demonstrate how the parameters from the Markov regime-switching regression may be used to model the cyclical behavior of revenue expansions and contractions. This allows us not only to construct probability distributions of the revenue shortfalls states are likely to confront during recessions (including multi-year recessions), but also to construct savings rate rules that are based on the uncertainty inherent in both expansions and contractions. The savings rate rules show the fraction of revenue that policymakers would need to save during each expansion period to hedge the possible expansion-contraction combinations that may occur in their state with a given level of certainty. Our results have important implications for policymakers who wish to smooth cyclical fl uctuations in the budget through the use of a rainy day fund or other type of savings instrument.
Measuring revenue shortfalls as the difference between the average expansion and average contraction, we fi nd that the typical state can expect a revenue shortfall equal to 13 to 18 percent of revenue dur-19 Given that the underlying regime in the Markov switching model is latent and unobservable, a reasonable approach to implementing a savings rule in practice would be to rely on the estimated probability that a state is in an expansion at a given point in time, S t . These probabilities provide very clear evidence using monthly data in favor of an expansion or contraction for nearly all of the observations. A simple way to implement a rule would be to assume the economy is in high growth (and, therefore, save) if S t > 0.5, and save zero otherwise.
ing a normal downturn. A representative state would, on average, build suffi cient savings to offset such a shortfall by saving 2.5-2.8 percent of the level of revenue during each expansion period. In other words, if the typical state followed this rule, then the state would be expected to accumulate enough savings during an expansion to maintain the average expansion growth rate in revenue throughout a normal recession and end the downturn with zero savings.
